Who Wins Wrongful Discharge Litigation in California: A Proposal for Reform by Horowitz, Craig A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-1990
Who Wins Wrongful Discharge Litigation in
California: A Proposal for Reform
Craig A. Horowitz
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Craig A. Horowitz, Who Wins Wrongful Discharge Litigation in California: A Proposal for Reform, 24 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 57 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol24/iss1/3
WHO WINS WRONGFUL DISCHARGE




In the past decade, California has witnessed an explosion in wrong-
ful discharge litigation.' This dramatic increase is due primarily to judi-
cially created exceptions to the presumption of at-will employment
embodied in section 2922 of the California Labor Code.2 The California
Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.3 nar-
rowed the relief available for wrongful terminations.' The Foley court
held that a plaintiff may receive contract but not tort damages for an
employer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
The availability of ancillary tort causes of action, however, provides
plaintiffs with an additional incentive to litigate wrongful discharge
cases. 6 While employers have marshalled a number of defenses to com-
* Associate, Labor and Employment Law Department, O'Melveny & Myers; B.A.,
Brown University, 1983; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1986. I wish to thank Suzanne Tieche
for her tireless efforts in typing the numerous drafts of this Article.
1. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, AVOIDING AND DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
CLAIMS § 19:01, at 2 n.1 (1987); see also Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A
Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 405 (1988) ("Although there are no precise
statistics available, it is clear that wrongful discharge litigation, which was hardly known in
the 1970s, is increasing geometrically .... "). In the last half of the 1980s, the office at which
the author works has handled approximately 400 to 500 wrongful discharge complaints.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989). The three judicially created exceptions to the
at-will rule are: (1) termination in violation of a fundamental public policy of the state,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839, 844 (1980); (2) breach of an implied-in-fact contract guaranteeing termination only for
good cause, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326-27, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925
(1981); and (3) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980). See infra notes
37-58 and accompanying text for an explanation of the at-will rule.
3. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
4. Id. at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
5. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
6. Depending on the facts of the particular case, plaintiffs commonly plead some or all of
the following tort theories: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) defamation; (4) fraud; (5) interference
with contract; (6) assault and battery; and (7) false imprisonment. See infra notes 63-143 and
accompanying text.
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bat these tort theories,7 a good plaintiff's lawyer often emerges from pre-
trial proceedings with at least one tort theory. Thus, it is unlikely, un-
less the California Supreme Court further curtails toit actions in the em-
ployment context, that wrongful discharge litigation will diminish
appreciably in the foreseeable future.9
This Article analyzes the wrongful discharge litigation explosion in
California in the 1980s. First, it briefly explains why the process needs
reform and the origins of wrongful discharge litigation. 10 The Article
then surveys important legal developments regarding tort causes of ac-
tion in the field of wrongful discharge and highlights the likely bat-
tlegrounds in California wrongful discharge litigation in the 1990s. 11
The Article next addresses the practical implications of the current sys-
tem for resolving wrongful discharge disputes.2 Finally, it proposes re-
form of wrongful discharge litigation so that both employers and
employees can resolve these relatively simple disputes in an expeditious
and fair fashion. 3 The author suggests that a streamlined litigation pro-
cess lasting no more than one year and culminating in a trial by jury
provides the best prospect for reforming the current system given the
divergent interests of the plaintiffs' bar and management.14 To strike a
7. Common defenses raised by defense counsel in the pleading and summary judgment
stage include: (1) the discharge relates to a private, rather than public, policy; (2) workers'
compensation provides the exclusive remedy for allegations of emotional distress; (3) an at-will
employee cannot reasonably or detrimentally rely on purported false assurances of continued
employment; (4) a qualified privilege attaches to defamatory comments made to interested
persons; (5) the manager's privilege precludes a claim of interference with contract; (6) a rea-
sonable person under the circumstances would not fear bodily injury; and (7) an employer has
an absolute privilege to detain an employee to investigate workplace misconduct. See infra
notes 63-143 and accompanying text.
8. See Brody, Wrongful Termination as Labor Law, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 434, 444 (1988).
The prospect for obtaining summary judgment increases substantially if the employer can re-
move the case from state court to federal court on diversity or federal question grounds. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b) (1988). In federal court, one judge monitors all aspects of the
case from filing through trial, and will likely become quite familiar with the facts and applica-
ble legal doctrine. In contrast, in most state courts the judges deciding motions are different
than the judges who eventually try the case. Thus, defense counsel should usually remove a
case to federal court on diversity or federal question grounds if permissible.
9. The court currently is reviewing Shoemaker v. Myers, 217 Cal. App. 3d 475, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 686, review granted, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987), which raises a number of
issues related to the availability of emotional distress damages. The parties briefed the matter
over two years ago, and the court heard oral argument on October 4, 1990. It is, of course,
impossible to predict what the court will decide.
10. See infra notes 16-58 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 59-143 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 144-217 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
14. One commentator has proposed arbitration of wrongful discharge cases, a proposal
which the plaintiff's bar strongly opposes because it takes the matter away from juries, who
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compromise between these competing factions, the author further sug-
gests that California courts eliminate the numerous ancillary tort issues
currently litigated in wrongful discharge suits, focus on whether the em-
ployer had good cause to discharge the employee, and award prevailing
plaintiffs back pay, reinstatement and reasonable attorneys' fees not to
exceed the amount of back pay awarded. 5
II. THE RATIONALE FOR REFORM
Almost all wrongful discharge cases involve one simple question:
Did the employer have good cause to discharge the employee?16 Plain-
tiffs, however, often plead numerous tort causes of action in their com-
plaints,17 thereby requiring defendants to engage in a complex motion
practice. In addition, plaintiff and defense counsel often engage in need-
less discovery through interrogatories and voluminous document re-
quests.1 Given the delay in reaching trial,19 defense counsel often
designate outplacement experts20 to attempt to prove that a plaintiff
failed to search diligently for comparable employment and, therefore,
generally favor employees. See Gould, supra note 1, at 414-15. Former California Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Grodin has recommended abolition of the at-will rule, a proposal op-
posed by management because it would interfere with management's discretion to make em-
ployment changes in the workplace. See Grodin, Remedy Wrongful Termination by Statute,
CAL. LAw., July, 1990, at 120.
15. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
16. This precise question constitutes the issue submitted to the arbitrator in virtually all
discharges arbitrated pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WoRKs 650-54 (4th ed. 1985). The only exceptions in the non-
union context concern probationary employees and employees who expressly acknowledge in
writing that employment is at will. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App.
3d 467, 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 621-22 (1984). The California Supreme Court has left open
the question of whether express at-will agreement preclude an implied contract claim. Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 680 n.23, 765 P.2d 373, 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
225 n.23 (1988).
17. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on California's Law of Wrongful
Termination, 20 PAc. L.J. 993, 1051 n.215 (1989) ("Foley's limitation on recoverable damages
has lead to adding statutory and intentional tort claims to wrongful termination complaints.").
18. See Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17
PEPPERDINE L. Rnv. 637 (1990).
19. All cases must be tried within five years of the filing of the complaint. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 1989). There is a staggering backlog of civil cases in some Cali-
fornia courts, and trials frequently do not commence until five years have almost elapsed. See
Selvin & Kakalik, LA. Civil Justice Heads for Gridlock, L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1990, at B7, col.
2.
20. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 24:06. Outplacement refers to organizations,
such as "headhunters," that assist employees in finding employment. Defense counsel will
frequently engage an outplacement expert to assess whether the plaintiff used proper tech-
niques to search for employment.
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failed to mitigate damages.2 1 Finally, in those cases that do reach trial,
the matter may become a battle of the experts who offer their opinions
about the amount of front pay22 and the nature and severity of emotional
distress purportedly suffered.23
Still, prevailing plaintiffs in wrongful discharge trials in Los Angeles
County between 1980 and 1986 received an average jury award of
$650,000.24 On the other hand, the top ten awards averaged nearly four
million dollars, whereas fifty percent of all prevailing plaintiffs received
$177,000 or less.2" Moreover, courts frequently reduce jury verdicts
post-trial.2 6 Taking into consideration the cases settled or dismissed, the
average money that changed hands amounts to approximately
$220,000.27 From that $220,000, approximately 40% of the plaintiff's
award is deducted for attorneys' fees.28
Although prevailing plaintiffs may receive handsome remuneration,
at what cost? A wrongfully discharged plaintiff typically does not seek
reinstatement to his or her former position.29 Plaintiffs, however, often
wait an inordinate amount of time before receiving any compensation,30
while lengthy depositions, court appearances and trial testimony can ex-
act an enormous emotional toll.31 Likewise, fear of job dislocation often
results in a plaintiff accepting subsequent employment which, although
21. Id.
22. Front pay is a remedy designed to compensate a plaintiff for future monetary losses
that will be incurred before full relief from discrimination is attained. S. SHULMAN & C.
ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY § 9.04[1] (1990). Back pay
refers to wages lost by plaintiff to the date of trial. Id. The calculation of front pay becomes a
critical issue if the plaintiff has not obtained a comparable job as of the date of trial because the
amount recoverable can be substantial. For example, an employee discharged at the age of
fifty could conceivably recover lost wages to the date of retirement unless the court deems such
recovery too speculative or the employer proves the employee failed to mitigate damages. See
ia § 9.04[3].
23. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:36; G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN,
WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION PRACTICE § 7.31, at 301 (1987).
24. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 13:01 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Jung & Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB. LAW. 257, 261 (1988).
28. See Jung & Harkness, Life After Foley: The Future of Wrongful Discharge, 41 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 131, 145 n.60 (1989). Most lawyers prosecute wrongful discharge actions on a
contingency fee basis, meaning that counsel will receive an agreed-upon percentage of any
ultimate settlement or judgment, less costs incurred in litigating that case. Id.
29. Gould, supra note 1, at 414 ("[B]y the time the matter gets through a jury trial, if the
employee had any interest in reinstatement, it has long since dissipated because of the frustra-
tions inherent in delay and the antagonisms that are associated with it.").
30. Selvin & Kakalik, supra note 19, at B7, col. 2.
31. Gould, supra note 1, at 414.
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similar in compensation, is not ideal.3 2
Wrongful discharge claims also take their toll on employers. Em-
ployers incur substantial defense costs even in cases which are ultimately
dismissed before trial.33 Obviously, defense costs escalate significantly if
the case goes to trial and is later appealed.3" The inability to predict
when a jury will award emotional distress or punitive damages 35 causes
some employers to either settle out of court even the most straightfor-
ward cases or retain unproductive or marginal employees.36 Before
describing the protracted litigation process which has resulted from a
well-intended response by the judiciary to the harshness of the statutory
at-will rule, this Article briefly explains the origins of wrongful discharge
litigation.
III. THE AT-WILL RULE AND THE ORIGINS OF WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE
The California legislature codified at-will employment over a cen-
tury ago.37 As currently codified, section 2922 of the California Labor
Code provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may be ter-
minated at the will of either party on notice to the other.,3 1 When
section 2922 controls, "the privilege of the employer to discharge the
employee with or without cause 'is absolute .... ,
Section 2922 creates a rebuttable presumption that the parties to an
employment contract with no specified term may terminate that contract
at will.4' That presumption, like other presumptions, is subject to con-
trary evidence.41 During the 1980s, California courts created three ex-
ceptions to section 2922 which allow discharged employees to sue their
32. Id
33. S. PEPE AND S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 19:01.
34. Id
35. Jury awards in wrongful termination lawsuits in California between 1982 and 1986
actually exceeded settlement demands by the employees' lawyers by 187%. Gould, supra note
1, at 405-06.
36. Id. at 411 ("There are many cases where employers have been fearful to dismiss a
marginal or unproductive employee as they look down the barrel of a jury gun about to
cock.").
37. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1999 (1872) (current version at CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West
1989)); see also S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 1:03.
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
39. Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (quoting Swaffield v.
Universal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 167, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680, 692 (1969)); see also
Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
40. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981).
41. Id.
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employers: (1) termination that contravenes public policy;42 (2) breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing not to be terminated
except for good cause;43 and, (3) breach of an implied-in-fact contract
not to be terminated except for good cause.' If an employee could sat-
isfy any of these exceptions, the employer would have to show good
cause for termination.4'
California courts had little trouble agreeing that a termination in
violation of public policy constituted a tort because such a cause of ac-
tion arose not from an employment contract, but from a duty implied in
law.4 6 Similarly, the courts agreed that the implied contract theory gave
rise to recovery in contract, not in tort. 7 Nonetheless, although several
courts of appeal recognized a tort cause of action for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,48 the Calfornia Supreme
Court never endorsed that principle.49
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,50 the California Supreme Court
confirmed that a termination in violation of public policy constitutes a
tort, and that an employee can obtain contract damages under an implied
contract theory if the employee can demonstrate termination without
good cause.5' The court also held that a cause of action for breach of an
42. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172-73, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-33, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1980).
43. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728
(1980).
44. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 327-28, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917, 924-25.
45. "Good cause" means "'a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on
the part of the party exercising the power.'" Id at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928 (quoting R.J.
Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 145, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 558 (1963)).
46. See, eg., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1166, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820,
826 (1986) ("As Tameny explained, the theoretical reason for labeling the discharge wrongful
in such cases is not based on the terms and conditions of the contract, but rather arises out of a
duty implied in law on the part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compliance with public
policy .... [Tihere is no logical basis to distinguish in cases of wrongful termination for
reasons violative of fundamental principles of public policy between situations in which the
employee is an at-will employee and [those] in which the employee has a contract for a speci-
fied term. The tort is independent of the term of employment.").
47. See, eg., id. at 1166-67, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
48. See id at 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 820; Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d
250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr.
524 (1984); Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728-29.
49. The California Supreme Court did discuss the issue as dictum. See Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769 n.6, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 n.6, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 n.6 (1984) (referring to Tameny, court observed "this court intimated that
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship might
give rise to tort remedies.").
50. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
51. Id.
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds only in contract,
not in tort.52 In so holding, the Foley court overruled Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 3 and its progeny which had recognized a claim for
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.54
Foley's holding with respect to the unavailability of tort damages is lim-
ited to the implied covenant cause of action.5" At least one subsequent
court of appeals decision has intimated, however, that the rationale of
Foley precludes tort damages in the employment setting for terminations
not in violation of public policy.56 Nonetheless, that issue remains
undecided.
Understandably, both pre- and post-Foley, plaintiffs have attempted
to pursue theories that might yield tort damages. 7 Typically, a wrongful
discharge complaint contains several traditional tort causes of action.58
The next section of this Article examines those ancillary tort causes of
action that have led to the protracted litigation process.
IV. TORT THEORIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The harshness of the statutory rule of at-will employment has
spawned judicial recognition of a series of causes of action most com-
monly referred to as "wrongful discharge" claims. 9 The original tort
theory approved by the California Supreme Court-wrongful termina-
tion in violation of public policy-provided a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee with the means to recover punitive and, arguably, emotional
distress damages." Recognizing the advantages of trying a case before a
jury when seeking emotional distress and punitive damages, resourceful
52. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
53. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
54. Id. at 457, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
55. Foley, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
56. Fidler v. Hollywood Park Operating Co., No. B038280 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Cal file) ("ENleither compensatory damages for emotional distress nor
punitive damages are recoverable in a wrongful discharge action."). But see Lanouette v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 272 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1990) (Foley only bars tort recovery
for implied covenant cause of action, and nothing else).
57. Because of traditional limitations on contract damages, such as foreseeability and cer-
tainty, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3300, 3301 (West 1970), an award of tort damages provides the
prospect for greater recovery.
58. The most commonly pled torts are termination in violation of public policy, inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, fraud, interference with con-
tract, assault and battery and false imprisonment. See infra notes 63-136 and accompanying
text.
59. See supra note 2.
60. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980).
November 1990]
64 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs' counsel developed a number of additional theories.61 These
theories include intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, fraud, interference with contract, assault and battery, and
false imprisonment. Some of these ancillary tort theories have proven
more successful than others, but the uncertainty in the law and the
number of causes of action routinely pled in wrongful discharge cases
permit a large number of claims to survive summary judgment.62
A. The Public Policy Exception
Public policy imposes a limitation on an employer's right to dis-
charge an at-will employee.6" Absent this limitation, "the threat of dis-
charge could be used to coerce employees into committing crimes,
concealing wrongdoing, or taking other action harmful to the public
weal."' 4 Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters6" first
stated this principle in 1959. In Petermann, a union business agent al-
leged that his refusal to commit perjury before a state legislative commit-
tee prompted his discharge. 6 The plaintiff in Petermann sought only
contract damages for his termination. 7 The Petermann court held:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary
to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to
discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a des-
ignated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the em-
ployee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined
by statute.68
A number of California decisions following Petermann have barred dis-
charge of at-will employees in violation of state policy governing labor-
management relations.69
61. The most common of these theories was a claim for tortious breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., however, the California
Supreme Court ruled that contract, not tort, damages are recoverable for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 696, 765 P.2d 373, 398-99, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 236-37 (1988). Plaintiffs typically prefer to proceed to trial with at least one tort
theory because they stand the chance to recover emotional distress and punitive damages in
addition to the lost wages recoverable in a breach of employment contract case.
62. Brody, supra note 8, at 444.
63. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665, 765 P.2d 373, 376, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 214 (1988).
64. Id.
65. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
66. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
67. Id. 344 P.2d at 27.
68. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
69. See, eg., Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970) (discharge
[Vol. 24:57
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In 1980, the California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co. 70 declared for the first time that an employee may sue in tort for
wrongful discharge if the employer "condition[s] employment upon re-
quired participation in unlawful conduct by the employee. ' 71  In
Tameny, the plaintiff alleged that his employer fired him for refusing to
engage in illegal price fixing of gasoline.72 The court held:
[A]n employer's authority over its employee does not include
the right to demand that the employee commit a criminal act to
further its interests.... An employer engaging in such conduct
violates a basic duty imposed by law upon all employers, and
thus an employee who has suffered damages as a result of such
discharge may maintain a tort action for wrongful discharge
against the employer.73
In so holding, the Tameny court explained that the cause of action did
not depend upon an express or implied promise in the employment con-
tract, "but rather reflect[ed] a duty imposed by law upon all employers in
order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in the
state's penal statutes."'74 Other courts have stressed general social policy
objectives by recognizing a public policy exception when termination
stems from the employee's assertion of a statutory right or performance
of a legal act.75
In the aftermath of Tameny, the debate surrounding the public pol-
icy exception focused on whether the public policy asserted must derive
from a statute.76 California defense counsel successfully persuaded sev-
eral courts of appeal to limit the holding of Tameny in such a fashion.77
of employee for engaging representative to negotiate terms and conditions of employment un-
lawful); Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1969) (same); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc. 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961).
70. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
71. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
72. Id. at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
73. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
74. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
75. See, eg., Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668-69, 765 P.2d at 378-79, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17
(policy implicated must benefit public, not merely private interests of employer); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (1984) (must
allege discharge either "in retaliation for asserting statutory rights, or for refusal to perform
illegal act"); see also Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (tort damages recover-
able for discharge of employee performing jury service).
76. Plaintiff's counsel took the position that any public policy, whether or not derived
from a statute, satisfied the exception. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 177, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 845. Defense counsel argued that the exception only applied when a specific statute
was implicated. Id.
77. See Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 819, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (1986);
November 1990]
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At least three other courts of appeal decisions addressing the issue con-
cluded that the public policy need not be embodied in a statute or consti-
tutional provision." These courts indicated that a violation of public
policy may derive from firmly established public policy of the state. The
California Supreme Court, however, did not resolve this conflict when it
decided Foley.79
The Foley court required courts to inquire "whether the discharge is
against public policy and affects a duty which inures to the benefit of the
public at large rather than a particular employer or employee."80 More-
over, the court noted that "disparagement of a basic public policy must
be alleged."81 In Foley, the plaintiff informed his employer that a fellow
employee "was currently under investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for embezzlement from his former employer... ."82 The
court concluded that under these circumstances the plaintiff could not
invoke the public policy exception. 3 The court reasoned that although
the information served the employer's interests, no public policy was in-
volved.84 The Foley court offered the following guidance in determining
what constitutes a public policy as opposed to merely the private interest
of the employer:
The absence of a distinctly "public" interest in this case is ap-
parent when we consider that if an employer and employee
were expressly to agree that the employee has no obligation to,
and should not, inform the employer of any adverse informa-
tion the employee learns about a fellow employee's background,
nothing in the state's public policy would render such an agree-
ment void. By contrast, in the previous cases asserting a dis-
charge in violation of public policy, the public interest at stake
was invariably one which could not properly be circumvented
by agreement of the parties.... Because here the employer and
employee could have agreed that the employee had no duty to
disclose such information, it cannot be said that an employer,
Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. 540, 546-47
(1985); Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
78. Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443-44, 234
Cal. Rptr. 129, 133-34 (1987); Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1556, 1561,
232 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492-93 (1986); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1165,
226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 825 (1986).
79. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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in discharging an employee on this basis, violates a fundamen-
tal duty imposed on all employers for the protection of the pub-
lic interest.8 5
Even under the above analysis, no clear-cut rules exist to determine
what activity constitutes a public interest and what constitutes merely a
private interest.86 Thus, the battle in wrongful discharge cases in the
1990's will most assuredly center on case-by-case resolution of this
question.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Most wrongful discharge complaints contain a cause of action for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 7 To prevail on a
common law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the conduct of the defendant was ex-
treme and outrageous, and (2) as a result of such behavior, the plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress.88 Although some courts have inti-
mated that discharge alone does not constitute extreme and outrageous
behavior,8 9 others have viewed the issue as a factual inquiry for the
jury.9
0
The most common defense employers raise rests on the exclusivity
provision of California's Workers' Compensation Act.91 The statute
makes an employer strictly liable for any injury sustained by his or her
employee arising out of or in the course of employment, 92 and it states
85. Id. at 670-71 n.12, 765 P.2d at 380 n.12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.12.
86. Compare American Computer Corp. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 664, 665,
261 Cal. Rptr. 796, 797 (1989) (employee discharged for internally reporting to management
about concerns regarding company embezzlement does not satisfy public policy exception)
with Verduzco v. General Dynamics, No. 88 1813-G(M) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (report by employee of defense contractor to management about lax
security satisfies public policy exception).
87. C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
SHIPS § 12.2 (2d ed. 1989).
88. See, eg., Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 616, 210 Cal. Rptr.
578, 587 (1985) (tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires dual showing of
outrageous conduct by employer and severe emotional distress suffered by employee).
89. See, eg., Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853-54 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (dis-
charge alone not sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct).
90. See, eg., Lanouette v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 272 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1990) (sufficient evidence of employer's outrageous conduct when employee discharged after
three weeks into ninety-day probation); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1984) (sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct when plaintiff discharged for dat-
ing competitor's employee).
91. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-3605 (West 1989).
92. Section 3600(a) states in pertinent part:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability
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that workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for such inju-
ries.9 Based on this language, defense attorneys have argued that the
workers' compensation statute preempts a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising from termination of employment.94 The
statute, however, contains certain specifically enumerated exceptions
which, if satisfied, permit an action at law.
5
Plaintiffs' counsel have made a number of arguments to rebut the
workers' compensation defense. The most common arguments raised in-
clude: (1) termination from employment does not arise out of or within
the course of employment;96 (2) the exclusivity provisions of the statute
only apply to physical injuries, not purely emotional injuries;9 7 and,
(3) an employer's intentional misconduct is not a "normal" part of the
employment relationship and renders the workers' compensation exclu-
sivity rule inapplicable.98
Employers gained a partial victory in this area under the California
Supreme Court's decision in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District.99
The Cole court expressly rejected the argument that the intentional na-
whatsoever to any person except as otherwise specifically provided in Sections 3602,
3706, and 4558, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any
injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death,
in those cases where the following conditions of compensation concur ....
Id. § 3600(a).
93. Section 3602 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the
right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section
and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy for the employee or his or
her dependents against the employer, and the fact that either the employee or the
employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the em-
ployee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to
bring an action at law for damages against the employer.
Id. § 3602.
94. See infra note 103.
95. The three exceptions are: (1) willful physical assault, fraudulent concealment of the
existence of an injury, and use of defectively manufactured product; (2) failure to secure the
payment of compensation; and (3) removal or failure to install power operation press guard,
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3602(b), 3706, 4558 (West 1989).
96. See, eg., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 144 Cal. App.
3d 72, 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1983) (court, in dicta, intimates that discharge does not
arise out of or in the course of employment).
97. See, eg., McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981) (when
thrust of complaint is emotional trauma, workers' compensation does not provide exclusive
remedy); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (civil
action permissible when plaintiff alleges emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury).
98. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 156, 160, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 262 (1987).
99. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
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ture of an employer's misconduct is not "normal. ' '" °" The court, how-
ever, did not decide whether discharge from employment arises in the
course of employment and, therefore, left open the issue of whether emo-
tional distress flowing from termination comes under the workers' com-
pensation exclusivity rule.10 1 While the court in Cole recognized that a
plaintiff's attempt to distinguish physical from emotional harm under the
statute created an artificial distinction, it did not resolve the issue.102
Since Cole, some courts have rejected this distinction, while others have
not. 103
100. Id. at 159-60, 729 P.2d at 750-51, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15. Post-Cole cases have
disagreed as to what Cole meant when it used the term "normal." One court of appeal has
suggested that all employer conduct is "normal" unless it fits into one of the three specifically
enumerated exceptions to the workers' compensation statute. Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 212 Cal. App. 3d 488, 499-500, 260 Cal. Rptr. 677, 685 ("m[ff an employee suffers an
injury compensable under Workers' Compensation Act, he or she may not recover any dam-
ages caused by that injury in a civil action for damages unless some exception to the exclusivity
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act is available."), modified 212 Cal App. 3d 1369
(1989). Other courts have decided the issue on a case by case basis. Compare Semore v. Pool,
217 Cal App. 3d 1087, 1104, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 290 (1990) (discharge for refusal to take eye
test to determine drug use considered normal part of work relationship) and Potter v. Arizona
S. Coach Lines, 202 Cal. App. 3d 126, 135, 248 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1988) (failure to comply
with duty to notify insured of conversion rights "does not constitute the type of outrageous
misconduct so distinct from the normal empolyer-employee relationship that a separate civil
cause of action should be permitted") with Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 510 (9th
Cir. 1989) (applying California law, layoff of employee following settlement negotiations con-
cerning complaints of racial discrimination not normal pattern of events in the workplace),
cert denied, 110 S. Ct 1524 (1990) and Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App.
3d 1420, 1429-31, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73-75 (1987) (intentional infliction of emotional distress
not considered normal working condition).
101. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. But see Traub v. Board
of Retirement, 34 Cal. 3d 793, 670 P.2d 335, 195 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1983) (pre-Foley case sug-
gesting that injuries caused by termination arose out of and in the course of employment).
Subsequent decisions of the courts of appeal unanimously hold that discharge by defini-
tion arises out of and in the course of employment. See, eg., Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 215 Cal.
App. 3d 29, 40, 263 Cal. Rptr. 422, 427 (1989) ("[]nsofar as plaintiff alleges he suffered emo-
tional distress by reason of defendants' conduct in causing his termination, his claim is pre-
cluded by the 'exclusivity remedy' provision of the Workers' Compensation Act"); Jenkins v.
Family Health Program, 214 Cal. App. 3d 440, 450, 262 Cal. Rptr. 798, 803 (1989) (" 'Termi-
nation necessarily arises out of the employment relationship since it is the event that ends that
relationship.'" (quoting Giorgi v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., 210 Cal. App. 3d 252, 265, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 426, 432 (1989)); Pichon, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 498, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 684 ("The exclu-
sive remedy for appellant's claim of injury to his psyche, whether caused by on the job harass-
ment or by termination, is provided by the Worker's Compensation Act").
102. 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P2d. at 750-51, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
103. See Miller, 885 F.2d at 510 (applying California law, claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress not barred by workers' compensation when no physical disability or injury).
Compare Zilmer, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28 (allegations of emotional
distress barred by Workers' Compensation Act) with Lanouette, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1111, 272
Cal. Rptr. at 439 (complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by
physical injury or disabiliy not barred by exclusivity doctrine). Nor can courts agree on
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The California Supreme Court will likely decide the issues left open
in Cole in the pending case of Shoemaker v. Myers.1" In Shoemaker, the
plaintiff sought damages for physical and emotional injuries allegedly
suffered as a result of his discharge from the position of special investiga-
tor for the Department of Health Services. 10 5 He asserted that his dis-
charge violated a statute which prohibits firing state employees for
reporting illegal activity to the Attorney General. 10 6 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the lower court's ruling sustaining a demurrer, holding
that all of the personal injuries alleged by plaintiff were compensable only
through workers' compensation."0 7 Thus, Shoemaker provides the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court an opportunity to address a number of issues left
open in Cole.
C. Other Ancillary Torts
1. Defamation
A defamation cause of action commonly appears in wrongful dis-
charge complaints.108 Employees frequently claim that the employer has
falsely labelled the employee as insubordinate or incompetent.10 9 Em-
whether a plaintiff has alleged physical injury. Compare Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 216
Cal App. 3d 1085, 1097-98, 265 Cal. Rptr. 294, 301 (1989) (complaint alleging that emotional
distress prevented plaintiff from attending to his occupation stated actual physical disability
compensable only through workers' compensaton) and Valenzuela v. State, 194 Cal App. 3d
916, 923, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1987) (anxiety, depression, sleep disturbance, heart palpita-
tions, headaches and earaches compensable only through workers' compensation) with La-
nouette, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1103, 1112, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 433 (employee who was "shaking
and visibly upset" and took "medication to calm [down]" has not alleged physical injury com-
pensable under workers' compensation).
104. 217 Cal. App. 3d 475, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, review granted, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr.
292 (1987).
105. Id at 478-79, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
106. Former Section 19683 of the Government Code provided in pertinent part:
No state officer or employee nor any person whatsoever shall directly or indirectly
use or threaten to use any official authority or influence in any manner whatsoever
which tends to discourage, restrain, interfere with, coerce or discriminate against any
other state officer or employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, or
otherwise brings to the attention of the Attorney General, or the Joint Legislative
Audit Committee pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 10540) of Chapter
4 of Part 2 of Division 2, or any other appropriate authority any facts or information
relative to actual or suspected violation of any law of this state or the United States
occuring on the job or directly related thereto. Any person guilty of such an act may
be liable in an action for civil damages brought against him by the offended party.
Notwithstanding the provision of section 19682, a violation of this section shall not
be a misdemeanor.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19683 (West 1980) (repealed 1979).
107. Shoemaker, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 485, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
108. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 2:09.
109. See, eg., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979)
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ployees may also plead a defamation count when their employer places
the employee under a "strong compulsion" to disclose the contents of
statements allegedly made about him or her-the so-called "self-publica-
tion rule."11 Thus, many plaintiffs claim defamation on the ground that
they had no choice but to inform subsequent employers of the purport-
edly false reason for their discharge.1 '
Truth constitutes an absolute defense to a cause of action for defa-
mation.11 2 The most successful defense at the summary judgment stage,
however, is the qualified privilege afforded to statements the employer
made to interested persons about the terminated plaintiff.113 To rebut
the qualified privilege, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer
published false statements not for a legitimate business reason, but with
malice. 114 Obtaining summary judgment based on the qualified privilege
often proves difficult because circumstances surrounding defamation
cases are quite fact specific." 5 Whether workers' compensation provides
the exclusive remedy for emotional distress claims associated with defa-
mation remains an open question. 6
2. Fraud
Many wrongful discharge complaints contain a cause of action for
fraud. Generally, the plaintiff alleges that the employer promised termi-
nation only for good cause, but that subsequently the employer broke the
(statements about job ability, coupled with racial epithets, defamatory); Gray v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986) (cause of action for defamation stated
where employee dismissed for insubordination).
110. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-
94 (1980).
111. Id.
112. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45, 46 (West 1982).
113. See Swaffield v. Universal Eesco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 162-63, 76 Cal. Rptr.
680, 689-90 (1969) (summary judgment for employer affirmed where qualified privilege at-
taches to statements about employee made by corporate officer in letter to investor). A quali-
fied privilege attaches to any statement made without malice to an interested person, such as
others in management or fellow employees. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). Such a
statement is not defamatory. See Deaile v. General Tel. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 846, 115
Cal. Rptr. 582, 585 (1974) (statement made in meeting with management regarding plaintiff's
job performance privileged).
114. Dealle, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
115. See Kelly v. General Tel. Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1982) (em-
ployee accused of misusing company funds avoiding privilege by pleading malice).
116. See Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983) (holding
workers' compensation does not provide exclusive remedy for emotional distress alleged in
defamation cause of action). But see Cole v. Fair Oaks Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 159-
60, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
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promise. 117 Another ground for fraud arises when the employer made an
allegedly false promise as an inducement to the employee to accept
employment. 
118
While courts have rarely considered the viability of fraud allegations
in the wrongful discharge context, 1 9 the reported California decisions
have summarily dismissed claims of fraud based on a purported promise
of good cause termination. 20 Because Foley, however, prohibits tort re-
covery for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
separate fraud counts in wrongful discharge complaints have become in-
creasingly common.1 21 Given the fact-specific nature of a fraud cause of
action and the dearth of appellate court decisions, many state trial courts
will not grant defense counsel summary judgment on such a claim. 121
3. Interference with contract
In many wrongful discharge complaints, the plaintiff names several
individuals, usually supervisors, as defendants.12 3 Although the termi-
nology of the cause of action varies, the gist of the claim against the
supervisors is that they conspired wrongfully to discharge the plaintiff
and interfered with an express or implied contractual requirement of
117. See, e.g., Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 799, 804, 270 Cal. Rptr.
585, 587 (1990) (plaintiff alleged employer fraudulently represented continuing employment).
118. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 61, 266 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1990) (fraud claim survived summary judgment where employer discharged employee prior to
his start date but after employee accepted employment offer and moved across country); Bur-
ton v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. App. 3d 972, 980, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (1988)
(fraud claim allowed when employee relies on false promise as an inducement to accept em-
ployment); Bondi v. Jewels by Edwar, Ltd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 672, 73 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1968)
(plaintiff induced to close his own business based on promise of long term employment can
claim fraud when promise not kept).
119. See C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, § 10.4.1.
120. See, e.g., Slivinsky, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 807, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (reliance by em-
ployee on oral promise of continuing employment which contradicts written agreement defin-
ing employment as at-will unreasonable).
121. See, eg., Slivinsky, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (plaintiff alleged
employer fraudulently represented she would have continuing employment); Zilmer v. Carna-
tion Co., 215 Cal. App. 3d 29, 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1989) (plaintiff alleged employer made
fraudulent representations to induce employee's resignation).
122. 1 COURT RULES, LAW AND DISCOVERY POLICY MANUAL (Daily J. Corp.) 203
(Jan. 2, 1990) (Los Angeles County Superior Court rule requiring moving party to "disprove
the assertions of the opposing party") Because a fraud allegation requires inquiry into a party's
intent, it is especially difficult to establish intent through a declaration without raising a triable
issue of fact which the plaintiff can contest.
123. C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, § 16.5, at 308-09. Plaintiffs often
name supervisors to avoid removal to federal court on diversity grounds. See S. PEPE & S.
DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 20:04, at 4.
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good cause for termination of employment. 24 To prevail on such a the-
ory, plaintiffs must show that the supervisors acted outside the scope of
their authority and for their own individual gain.'25
The most common defense asserted to a claim for interference with
contract is the so-called "manager's privilege."' 26 This privilege derives
from the principle that corporate supervisors acting on behalf of the cor-
poration cannot induce a breach of the corporation's contract with the
employee because the supervisor's confidential relationship with the cor-
poration renders their conduct privileged. 127 A plaintiff can defeat this
defense, however, if he or she can set forth specific facts to indicate that
the supervisors had purely personal motives, as opposed to the interest of
the corporation in the employee's discharge.1
2 8
4. Assault and battery
Given proper facts, a plaintiff in a wrongful discharge case may suc-
cessfully plead causes of action for assault and battery. 9 For example,
such claims can arise in harassment cases.'3 0 An assault and battery
claim may also lie where the employee has an altercation with a supervi-
sor.13" ' In addition, a plaintiff might plead an assault claim when an em-
ployer interrogates him or her in connection with a theft or drug
allegation and detains the employee during the meeting.'
32
124. C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, § 16.5, at 308-09.
125. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
126. DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 879 F.2d 459,464 (9th Cir. 1989)
(applying California law).
127. Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 72-73, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (1963);
see also Lawrence v. Bank of Am., 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 437, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1985);
Mayes v. Sturdy N. Sales, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 69, 77-78, 154 Cal. Rptr. 43, 48 (1979);
Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12-13, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (1972).
128. See McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying
California law); Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1982)
(applying California law).
129. Such a cause of action would arise if a male employee sexually harassed a female em-
ployee and touched her in the workplace without her consent. Another circumstance would be
a "shoving" match between an employee and supervisor during a workplace argument or
dispute.
130. See, eg., Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1987) (claim for assault and battery permissible where co-employee grabbed em-
ployee's genitals, jumped on him and pinched him).
131. See, e.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975)
(civil action against employer permissible when employee suffers emotional distress after sus-
taining back injury when her boss hit her and threw her on ground).
132. See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973)
(employer can be liable for intentional tort committed by agent); Alterauge v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, 97 Cal. App. 2d 735, 218 P.2d 802 (1950) (employer liable for battery committed
by agent against employee).
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Inventive plaintiffs' counsel may try to plead an assault and battery
count even in cases that do not involve physical contact. For example,
an employee might fear physical harm if a supervisor confronts him or
her in an aggressive or hostile fashion. The broad definition of assault
may, in fact, encompass merely a fear of physical harm.I33 By pleading
such a cause of action, plaintiffs could argue that the workers' compensa-
tion exclusivity doctrine does not apply to bar emotional distress dam-
ages in a civil action because of the codified exception provided for
willful physical assault.'34
Presumably, however, a workers' compensation exclusivity defense
to an assault cause of action would lie if the defendant could show that
no reasonable person would fear physical harm under the circum-
stances, 135 or to a battery cause of action if the plaintiff did not actually
suffer a willful, physical injury.' 36 Nonetheless, the fact-specific nature
of both of these defenses may preclude summary judgment on this cause
of action.
5. False imprisonment
A related theory that sometimes surfaces in wrongful discharge
complaints is false imprisonment. 13 7 To establish a false imprisonment
claim, a plaintiff must show physical restraint accomplished by either
force or fear of force.' 38 Such a claim may arise if an employer questions
an employee's conduct on the job,' 39 and the employee reasonably be-
lieves that the employer intends to harm the employee upon an attempt
to leave the room in which the questioning takes place."4
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 33 (1965).
134. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 1989) (plaintiff who demonstrates willful
physical assault may proceed in civil action for emotional distress damages).
135. See Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 146 P.2d 57, 60 (1944) (assault is
"an invasion of the right of a person to live without being put in fear of personal harm").
136. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1). But see People v. Martinez, 3 Cal. App. 3d 886, 83
Cal. Rptr. 914 (1970) (barefoot kick to shin of police officer battery even though no injury
suffered because contact was willfully inflicted).
137. Rojo v. Kliger, 209 Cal. App. 3d 10, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (court granted employee leave
to amend complaint to add claim for false imprisonment against employer), review granted,
775 P.2d 1035, 260 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1989); Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d
878, 220 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1985) (employee stated claim for false imprisonment against
employer).
138. People v. Martinez, 150 Cal. App. 3d 579, 599-600, 198 Cal. Rptr. 565, 578-80 (1984);
Onick v. Long, 154 Cal. App. 2d 381, 386, 316 P.2d 427, 431 (1957).
139. This would arise most frequently when the employer suspects the employee of theft or
drug use.
140. See, eg., Parrott v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 14, 22, 217
P.2d 89, 95 (1950) (employer's detention and questioning of employee suspected of embezzle-
ment constituted false imprisonment).
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Employers may assert several defenses to such a claim. With re-
spect to interviewing an employee about drug use in the workplace or the
theft of company property, some courts might favorably consider the de-
fense that an employer has an absolute privilege to conduct such an inter-
view. 41 Moreover, if the employer hires an outside agency to conduct
such interviews, and the agency acts beyond the authority extended to it
by the employer, the employer can argue that it is not vicariously liable
for such conduct.142
The discussion above illustrates the multiple tort theories and de-
fenses that may be raised in even the most simple wrongful discharge
case. Because the California Supreme Court has given few definitive an-
swers as to the viability of a number of these theories,143 plaintiffs will
continue to plead numerous torts and defendants will continue to engage
in a complex motion practice. The next section of this Article discusses
the practical effects of this legal jockeying among counsel.
V. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
LITIGATION
The wide variety of tort theories commonly pled in wrongful dis-
charge cases often leads to protracted litigation and heated discovery bat-
tles-the lawyers' equivalent of trench warfare."* At the conclusion of
discovery, both parties often designate experts to testify about emotional
distress and other issues.14 ' This leads to a whole new round of expen-
sive discovery immediately preceeding trial."4 6 At trial, expert testimony
141. But see Vandiveer v. Charters, 110 Cal. App. 347, 355-58, 294 P. 440, 444-45 (1930)
(employer may be liable for false imprisonment where induces employee by force or fear of
arrest to interview).
142. See, e.g., Noble, 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (employer only vicariously
liable when agent acts within scope of authority). Vicarious liability refers to acts of an agent
that can be imputed to a principal. W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 508 (5th ed. 1984). However, an employer
will not be liable for the acts of an agent if the agent was acting outside the scope of the
employment. Id. at 502.
143. Since 1980, the California Supreme Court has only addressed wrongful discharge is-
sues in three cases. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 151, 729 P.2d
743, 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 309 (1987) (workers' compensation provides exclusive remedy
where plaintiff injured by harrassment in workplace); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 663, 765 P.2d 373, 374, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 212 (1988) (tort damages not
recoverable for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 169-70, 610 P.2d 1330, 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (1980)
(tort cause of action exists for discharge in violation of public policy).
144. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
145. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
146. Depositions of experts take place at the end of the discovery process and right before
trial. In California, the parties must make a written demand for a list of experts ten days after
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regarding when the plaintiff should have obtained alternative employ-
ment, the amount of lost wages and benefits, and the nature and severity
of a plaintiff's emotional distress make even the most simple wrongful
discharge case complex.' 47 This section examines the discovery process
and the trial of wrongful discharge cases and concludes with a discussion
of the effects of wrongful discharge litigation on employees and
employers.
A. The Discovery Process
The discovery process begins at a very early stage in a typical
wrongful discharge action.148 Most defendants will serve a notice of dep-
osition and request for production of documents on the plaintiff when
filing their answer to the plaintiff's complaint. 14 9 Depositions can last
three, four or even five or more days, depending on the particular allega-
tions. 150 Because most complaints contain a prayer for emotional dis-
tress damages, 151 defendants must probe into the most sensitive areas of a
plaintiff's life to ascertain the nature and severity of plaintiff's emotional
distress.'
5 2
Normally, plaintiffs' attorneys do not depose the employer's wit-
nesses immediately, but instead send out document requests and inter-
rogatories in order to compile information and better assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the employee's case.153 Until counsel receive such in-
formation, they must operate solely on the facts supplied by clients, the
limited documentation clients' retained, and the employee's personnel
file.'5 4 In California, a party can request an unlimited number of docu-
the court sets the trial date or seventy days before the trial date, whichever comes later. CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 2034(b) (West Supp. 1990). The parties must exchange their expert lists
simultaneously twenty days after service of the demand or fifty days before trial, whichever
comes later. Id. § 2034(c). Each side must pay the expert's hourly fee for providing deposition
testimony. Id. § 2034(i)(2).
147. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:36. Indeed, because the length of the dam-
age phase of the trial often approximates the length of the liability phase, many employers
move the court to bifurcate the trial between liability and damages.
148. Id. § 22:01.
149. Id.
150. Id §§ 22:13, 22:17.
151. See supra note 87.
152. See Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 859, 574 P.2d 766, 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,
704 (1978); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 425, 467 P.2d 557, 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835
(1970).
153. G. SAPERSTIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 6.10.
154. Id. §§ 6.3, 6.10. Employees may obtain any document which they have signed from
their personnel files prior to the commencement of litigation. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432 (West
1983 & Supp. 1990). Employees may also review any document in their personnel files at the
location where the employer keeps the file. Id. § 1198.5.
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ments, covering almost every conceivable area of the plaintiff's work his-
tory and the employer's policies and procedures. 5 '
Both plaintiffs and defendants must produce virtually all documents
the opposing party requests and answer interrogatories fully and com-
pletely.156 The parties can, however, preserve any appropriate objections
at trial by so stating in the written response.'5 7 Unfortunately, abuses of
the discovery process abound on both sides.' Plaintiffs often appear at
depositions without all the documents requested by employers and thus,
delay the completion of the deposition.'59 Plaintiffs' counsel contend
that defendants often give perfunctory answers to interrogatories and, at
least initially, withhold certain documents on relevance or other grounds.
Although the California Civil Discovery Act of 1986'" appears to man-
date sanctions for a party who brings or opposes a discovery motion
without substantial basis, 161 this threat of sanctions has not substantially
decreased the motion practice in the discovery phase. 62
Even before the plaintiff begins to depose the employer's witnesses,
costs during the initial discovery phase can escalate rapidly.163 The costs
for a court reporter and preparation of a transcript for a deposition can
range anywhere from $600 to $1,000 per day, not including attorneys'
fees for deposition preparation and the taking of the deposition itself. 6'
In addition, the cost of responding to discovery requests can bring the
employer's expenses to well over ten thousand dollars during this early
stage.16
5
How a case will proceed after the early discovery stage often de-
pends on the financial resources of the plaintiff and the value the plain-
tiff's counsel puts on the case. 166 Many plaintiffs' counsel often advance
all costs, including deposition fees.' 67 Thus, rather than using the shot-
155. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2031(a) (West Supp. 1990). Fortunately, absent court ap-
proval, California has limited the number of interrogatories to thirty-five, exclusive of form
interrogatories approved by the Judicial Council. Id § 2030(c).
156. See id §§ 2030(f), 2031(f).
157. Id.
158. See Reavley, supra note 18, at 639-42.
159. See S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:31. In such circumstances, the defend-
ant must make a motion to compel production of documents. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 2031(1) (West Supp. 1990).
160. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West Supp. 1990).
161. Id. § 2023 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
162. See Reavley, supra note 18, at 650-51.
163. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:04.
164. Id.
165. Id. §§ 22:29, 22:30.
166. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 6.1.
167. Jung & Harkness, supra note 28, at 145.
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gun approach of deposing any potentially relevant witness, many plain-
tiffs must narrow their choices to reflect a counsel-imposed limitation on
available funds."' 8 Plaintiff's counsel should, at a minimum, depose the
plaintiff's supervisor169 and a person knowledgeable about the em-
ployer's personnel policies.'
70
Once depositions conclude, the employer will normally file a motion
for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of
issues. 171 Filing such a motion can be quite costly to the employer, espe-
cially given the stringent requirements on the motion format which many
branches of the superior court have imposed. 1 2 Plaintiff's counsel must
also spend considerable time responding to the motion and submitting
counter-affidavits, if appropriate. 7 3 An employer who loses the sum-
mary judgment motion may chose to file a writ of mandate with the court
of appeal.' 74 A plaintiff may also fie a writ to the court of appeal if he or
she loses a portion of a summary judgment motion.' 71 Of course, if the
employer prevails on the motion in its entirety, the plaintiff can ap-
peal.'7 6 All of this amounts to added expense and time, and delays a final
resolution.
If a tort theory survives summary judgment, both parties will likely
engage in additional discovery, including depositions of experts. 17 7 Pre-
paring and deposing experts is often the most expensive part of the litiga-
tion process.'78 Psychiatric experts charge anywhere from $100 to $300
an hour for consultation time, deposition preparation and testimony and
the party taking an expert's deposition must tender the expert's fee at the
commencement of the deposition.' 79 Defense experts typically conduct
168. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 6.4.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 6.5, at 248.
171. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 23:04; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 4370
(West Supp. 1990).
172. See, eg., 1 COURT RULES, LAW AND DISCOVERY POLICY MANUAL (Daily J. Corp.)
IS 200-11 (Jan. 2, 1990). In Los Angeles County, defendants must file a separate statement of
undisputed facts, notice of motion, index of out-of-state authority and a proposed order. Id
Defendants must attach all deposition pages and exhibits relied on in the motion. Id. 206.
The separate statement now must have separate headings for each issue and every fact disposi-
tive of each issue must appear in numerical order below the issue. Id. 207.
173. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1990).
174. See id. § 437c(1).
175. Id.
176. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 902 (West 1980).
177. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:36; G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra
note 23, § 7.31, at 301.
178. For a discussion of the need for expert testimony in wrongful discharge litigation, see
generally G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 7.31, at 301.
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(i)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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mental examinations of the plaintiff pursuant to the California Civil Pro-
cedure Code.180 These examinations generally last three hours, can
cause an employee great stress and cost the employer much money."
Employers typically designate and prepare an outplacement expert 82 to
testify about a plaintiff's job search in order to limit the amount of con-
tract damages.' 8 3 Such an expert can testify regarding whether plaintiff,
in the expert's opinion, used the proper technique in order to find a
job.' 4 None of this discovery pertains directly to the basic issue in these
cases: whether the employer had good cause to terminate the plaintiff.
The subsidiary issues, however, tend to dominate both the discovery pro-
cess and the trial. This Article next examines the trial of wrongful dis-
charge actions.
B. Trial of Wrongful Discharge Cases
A large portion of the time and cost involved in a trial stems from
preparation of jury instructions and motions in limine. 85 Given the
rapid development of law in this area, and the conflicting decisions
among the courts of appeal,'86 the instructions proffered by each side
usually differ substantially."8 7 Both parties spend a great deal of time
preparing jury instructions because the refusal of an appropriate jury in-
struction preserves important arguments on appeal.18 8
Both the employer and employee in wrongful discharge cases also
generally file a number of motions in limine. 89 Many of the employer's
motions pertain to the exclusion of evidence regarding claims of emo-
180. See id. § 2032 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). Under section 2032, a mental exam is per-
missible when a plaintiff puts his or her emotional state at issue in this case. Reuter v. Superior
Court, 93 Cal. App. 3d 332, 155 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1979). Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal.
App. 2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966).
181. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 7.31.
182. An outplacement expert analyzes what techniques a plaintiff used to find comparable
employment and testifies whether such efforts were reasonable. For example, if an employee
only responded to two newspaper advertisements in six months, and did not use a headhunter
service or send out resumes, an outplacement expert would testify, based on his or her experi-
ence in counseling employees, whether the effort was adequate. See, eg., State Personnel
Recruiting Servs. Bd. v. Home, 732 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
183. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 24:06.
184. See supra note 20.
185. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 25.04; G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra
note 23, § 7.11.
186. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
187. C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, § 15.14.
188. Ortiz v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 852 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1987)
(litigating parties entitled to jury instructions supported by California law).
189. See C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, § 15.11.
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tional distress or anecdotal testimony of the employee's friends.190 De-
fendants often seek to preclude testimony regarding emotional distress in
its entirety or, at a minimum, to limit the testimony in some fashion. 191
The plaintiff's motions in limine generally focus on excluding evidence
regarding other potential sources of emotional distress-such as marital
or family problems-on the ground that the prejudice of such evidence
outweighs any probative value. 192 Depending on the deposition testi-
mony of the experts, additional motions may seek to limit or exclude
certain opinions set forth by the expert.
193
At trial, the real risk for an employer is the potential for a large
assessment of emotional distress and punitive damages.194 Accordingly,
much of the actual case presentation at trial centers around issues of
emotional distress, and the jury hears evidence regarding conflicting psy-
chiatric evaluations of the plaintiff. 9 Thus, even the most simple termi-
nation case can turn into a lengthy presentation of complex medical
evidence.196 Consequently, the damage phase of a wrongful discharge
trial lasts at least as long as the liability phase.'
97
By the time a wrongful termination trial concludes, an employee
may have spent years in litigation, 19 and both the employee and em-
ployer have often incurred significant legal expenses.' 99 This Article next
discusses the practical implications of the wrongful discharge litigation
process for both plaintiffs and defendants.
C. The Effect on Plaintiffs and Defendants
All litigation causes strain on those who participate, but the manner
in which wrongful discharge litigation has evolved places those em-
broiled in the controversy under acute stress.2 °° Neither plaintiffs nor
defendants emerge from this process unscathed.20 '
190. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 25:04; G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra
note 23, § 7.13.
191. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 25:04.
192. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 7.13.
193. S. PEPE & S. DuNHAM, supra note 1, § 25:04.
194. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
195. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 8.37.
196. See S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 22:36.
197. For this reason, many defendants move to bifurcate liability and damages. G. SAPER-
STEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 8.4.
198. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
200. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, §§ 4.5-4.6.
201. Gould, supra note 1, at 413 ("[The new common law of wrongful discharge has pro-
vided employer and employee with the worst of all possible worlds.").
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Termination from employment ranks as one of life's most stressful
situations.2"2 The wrongful discharge litigation process perpetuates this
stress.20 3 In the course of five or more years of litigation, the employee
must relive his or her termination on numerous occasions. In addition,
because of the numerous tort theories involved,2" employees expose
themselves to broad discovery probing into the most sensitive areas of
their lives.205 If an employer must defend against a claim of emotional
distress, it has a legitimate right to delve into other life events that may
have contributed to the stress.20 6 This may involve detailed discovery
into such matters as marital affairs, sexual fulfillment, drug abuse, alco-
holism and a host of other issues.20 7 Employers may properly inquire
into the employee's psychiatric history, including the subject and nature
of counseling sessions prior to the termination.20 However, because
none of these issues involves an assessment of the plaintiff's job perform-
ance, they may have no relevance to the question of whether the em-
ployer had good cause to terminate the employee.
Wrongful termination lawsuits also have a profound effect on the
employer's representatives whose reputations may suffer because of the
dispute.209 Few individuals relish the task of terminating an employee,
and often the final decision to terminate an employee comes only after
extreme soul-searching.210 Employers' representatives must relive their
decisions for years during the course of litigation. In addition, most
complaints now name individual supervisors as defendants.211 The
stigma of being sued can exact a tremendous toll on the supervisor.
2 12
Moreover, even though most companies agree to defend their supervisors
at no cost and bear the financial burden of any ultimate settlement or
202. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 718-19, 765 P.2d 373, 415, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 253, (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
203. Gould, supra note 1, at 413.
204. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205. See Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978);
In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
206. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 436, 467 P.2d at 571, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
207. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, § 7.13.
208. See Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 435, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (medical records relevant to partic-
ular condition plaintiff has placed in issue admissible).
209. See S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 6:03.
210. Id. A supervisor's reluctance to confront subordinates with bad news often results in
the supervisor failing to communicate unsatisfactory performance until the proverbial straw
that breaks the camel's back which results in the employee's belief that the termination was
arbitrary or capricious. Id. § 3:02.
211. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979) (supervisors and com-
pany jointly liable for damages); see S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 6:03.
212. See S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, §§ 6:01-6:03.
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judgment, supervisors often realize that an adverse result may cause
those above them in the corporate hierarchy to second-guess their deci-
213 fe aesions. Many supervisors feel that if the company loses such a case,
they should resign.214 Others fear that their job may depend on the out-
come of the litigation.215
Both employees and employers suffer needlessly under the current
wrongful discharge litigation system. Although some plaintiffs may ulti-
mately reap a substantial award, the vast majority end up disheartened
by the process.21 6 The same invariably applies even to victorious em-
ployers.217 Accordingly, the final portion of this Article recommends
substantial reform to the wrongful discharge litigation system that will
benefit both employees and employers in the long run.
VI. A STREAMLINED LITIGATION PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE DISPUTES
The current system for adjudicating wrongful discharge cases needs
drastic reform. Wrongful discharge cases take too long to resolve,218 in-
volve a discovery process which is far too costly and time consuming219
and have become needlessly complex to try.220 Some management pro-
ponents have urged arbitration as the sole forum for wrongful discharge
disputes.22 But arbitration has received vocal opposition from the plain-




216. Gould, supra note 1, at 413 ("[T]he employees who benefit are few and far between.").
Approximately 25% of cases are disposed of by summary judgment, and another 50-70%
settle, usually for a reasonable sum. S. PEPE & S. DUNHAM, supra note 1, § 19.01. Fifty
percent of the remaining 5-25% of cases that go to trial result in the plaintiff receiving a
judgment of less than $177,000. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
217. Gould, supra note 1, at 413.
218. For example, in Foley, the plaintiffwas discharged in 1983 and his case was litigated at
least through 1988. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665, 765 P.2d 373,
375, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1988).
219. G. SAPERSTEIN & B. SILVERMAN, supra note 23, §§ 4.4, 4.7. Defendants in wrongful
termination cases use extensive discovery as preparation for a motion for summary judgment.
Especially if a large corporation is the defendant, witnesses are often located out of state, thus
increasing the cost of litigation. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Miller, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.: The California Supreme Court Takes Un-
certain Steps Toward Certainty in Wrongful Discharge, 11 WHITrnER L. REv. 595, 603 (1989)
("Perhaps abolition of emotional distress would be a viable trade-off for the more affordable
forum of arbitration."); see also Gould, supra note 1, at 415-16.
222. Gould, supra note 1, at 420 ("The current debate about a better system has resulted in
a legislative standoff in California.").
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Joseph Grodin argues that the California Legislature should abolish the
at-will presumption embodied in section 2922 of the California Labor
Code,223 a proposal opposed by management.224
The plaintiff's bar will likely attempt to prevent sweeping reform of
the current system and will continue to lobby effectively against arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, management will likely lobby just as strongly
against abolition of the at-will rule. This Article proposes a streamlined
litigation procedure for all wrongful discharge cases which will strike a
middle ground between management and the plaintiff's bar. It recom-
mends that courts eliminate tort recovery in wrongful discharge cases
except for discharges in violation of public policy. This way, the parties
will be forced to focus on the main issue of good cause for discharge
rather than ancillary issues. Indeed, both the call for arbitration and
Justice Grodin's argument to abolish the at-will rule have, as their com-
mon core, the notion that these cases involve the relatively simple deter-
mination of whether good cause supported the discharge at issue.225
Once courts focus on the good-cause issue,2 26 they should also place rigid
limits on discovery and require a trial within one year of the filing of the
complaint. 227 To remedy a wrongful discharge, a jury should award
back pay and reinstatement to the prevailing plaintiff. Additionally, to
satisfy the plaintiff's bar, counsel for a prevailing plaintiff should receive
reasonable attorneys' fees not to exceed the amount of back pay awarded.
Initially, this Article urges that courts follow the admonition in Fo-
ley v. Interactive Data Corp. 228 that "the employment relationship is fun-
damentally contractual ' 229 and refuse to recognize all tort theories
except termination in violation of public policy.230 For discharges not
based on the public policy exception, the typical wrongful discharge jury
trial should involve only three issues:
223. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
224. Grodin, supra note 14, at 120. This author takes no position on whether arbitration
provides the best means to resolve wrongful discharge disputes or whether the Legislature
should abolish section 2922. He seeks to suggest a reform that would satisfy both sides.
225. Under Professor Gould's proposal, the same standard would apply in the non-union
context. Similarly, abolition of the at-will rule would mean that all terminations would have to
be supported by good cause. Gould, supra note 1, at 404.
226. Good cause is the focus of all discharges pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment. See F. ELKOuRI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 16, at 650-54.
227. For example pursuant to CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 68600-68619 (West Supp. 1990) the
Los Angeles Superior Court has promulgated rules to attempt to reduce the time it takes to get
to trial in a civil action. The goal of this "fast track" program is to dispense of 90% of all civil
cases within one year of filing a complaint. See L.A. Sup. Cr. R. 1100-1210.
228. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
229. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
230. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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1. Whether the employment relationship is at-will for the par-
ticular employee.
2. If not, whether the employer had good cause to terminate
the employee.
3. If the employer did not have good cause to terminate the
employee, whether the employee should receive reinstatement,
backpay, attorney's fees or a combination of the three.
To answer the first question, the jury should consider " 'the person-
nel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of ser-
vice, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the
employee is engaged.' "23 Otherwise, employment should be deemed at
will. Often, however, at least one of these factors exists. Probationary
employees certainly should not have any right to termination only for
good cause because an employer needs some time to assess its business
needs and the employee's performance. Thus, employers should set forth
a specific probationary period in their policies. Currently, some employ-
ers expressly define employment as at will in writing to attempt to pro-
tect themselves against runaway jury verdicts.232 Several courts have
held that a signed, written agreement stating that employment is at will
precludes any evidence of a contradictory promise of termination only
for good cause.233 The continuing viability of these at-will agreements is
unclear because some courts have permitted their modification during
the course of employment.2 4 In any event, if courts follow the author's
recommended streamlined litigation procedures, including limitations on
damages, some employers who have half-heartedly utilized at-will agree-
ments to protect against large tort verdicts may abandon them and, in-
231. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (1981)).
232. See, ag., Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (written
employment contract signed by employee expressly stated employment was terminable at will);
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 621
(1984) (implied contract claim dismissed because employee signed written stock option agree-
ment stating he was employed at will).
233. Crain, 560 F. Supp. at 852; Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 187 Cal.
App. 3d 299, 316, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (1986); Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 482, 199 Cal,
Rptr. at 621.
234. See, e.g., Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1379, 265
Cal. Rptr. 412 (1989) (at-will agreement may be modified by subsequent implied agreement).
The California Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue of whether express, written
agreements providing that employment may be terminated at will can be modified by a subse-
quent implied agreement. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680 n.23, 765 P.2d at 387 n.23, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
225 n.23.
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stead, defend the claims by arguing that good cause supported the
discharge.
If the employee rebuts the at-will presumption, the issue becomes
whether good cause existed for the termination. While some reasons for
termination constitute good cause as a matter of law, such as a bona fide
economic reduction in force, 35 most wrongful discharge cases simply in-
volve a factual determination as to whether the employee's job perform-
ance warranted discharge. If wrongful discharge cases focus solely on
this issue of good cause, the entire litigation process should last only one
year.236 Indeed, superior court judges can and should place limitations
on discovery and enforce rigid adherence to discovery and motion cut-off
dates.2 37 Without the numerous subsidiary issues raised by ancillary tort
claims, courts could require that depositions of a plaintiff take one or, at
most, two days, and courts could limit document requests by plaintiffs to
only those documents pertaining to employment policies and the grounds
for termination. 38 In short, a litigation process that now stretches
through three, four or five years could easily conclude in a year's time.239
Although some superior courts have a tremendous case backlog,
240
judges might be willing to hear these cases within a year of the filing of
the complaint if they knew that the entire trial would last two to three
days instead of two or three months.
Under the streamlined procedures outlined above, the same reme-
dial scheme typically employed in arbitrations under collective bargain-
ing agreements should apply in wrongful discharge cases. 24 1  An
arbitrator typically orders reinstatement and back pay or, in certain cir-
cumstances, reinstatement without back pay.242 Although courts tradi-
tionally refuse to compel specific performance of employment
contracts,243 arbitrators have frequently done so in the organized labor
235. See, eg., Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 231
Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986) (business reorganization because of bona fide economic reasons consti-
tutes good cause for layoff).
236. See supra note 227.
237. Id.
238. L.A. Sup. Cr. R. 1106.4.3.4 ("The Court shall have the responsibility for regulating
the timing, scope and completion of discovery.").
239. See supra note 218.
240. Selvin & Kakalik, supra note 19, at B7, col. 2 ("Civil litigants have to wait over four
years for an open courtroom.").
241. Arbitrations pursuant to collective bargaining agreements generally take place within a
short specified time period set forth in the agreement. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra
note 16, at 191-98.
242. Id.
243. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 1970).
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workforce context. 2" Arguably, reinstatement in the collective bargain-
ing context provides a more appropriate remedy than in the non-union
context because employees who return to work pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement have the union to provide a check on manage-
ment.245 In view of these concerns, courts should permit the employee to
make a post-trial motion requesting the court to exercise its equitable
power and order the employer to provide outplacement services until the
employee finds comparable employment. In an egregious circumstance,
the judge could order the accumulation of back pay until outplacement
services secure the plaintiff another job. The court could monitor the
employee's progress in finding employment through status conferences or
other means.
Finally, to achieve the support of the plaintiffs' bar, a prevailing
wrongful discharge plaintiff should also recover reasonable attorneys'
fees. This should provide plaintiff's counsel with the requisite incentive
to continue accepting these cases. In fact, many plaintiff's counsel would
probably earn more money annually by recovering fees from litigating a
steady stream of wrongful discharge cases than by investing up to five
years under the present system and hoping for a large verdict.246 The
amount of attorneys' fees recoverable, however, should be limited to the
amount of back pay awarded to keep the damages at a reasonable level.
A streamlined litigation system operating in the manner suggested is
far more preferable than the current system and would prove beneficial
to both employees and employers. Employees would receive their rem-
edy for wrongful discharge much sooner and might also be able to return
to jobs they held for many years prior to the discharge. Plaintiff's attor-
neys would still have an incentive to represent employees because they
could recover substantial attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs would not lose the
ability to have their cases considered by a jury of their peers.
Employers gain a substantial degree of predictability of outcome in
this streamlined litigation procedure. Defense costs should plummet be-
cause of shortened discovery procedures and trials. Although the em-
244. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 16, at 688-91. The California Civil Code cur-
rently prohibits specific performance of employment contracts. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West
1970). The Legislature could easily amend the civil code to permit reinstatement.
245. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 16, at 688-91.
246. Under the proposal, plaintiff's counsel could recover attorneys' fees equal to the back
pay awarded. Suppose that a plaintiff's counsel handles six two-day trials during a year for
employees whose annual salaries average $50,000. Even if counsel prevails in only one half of
these cases, he or she could earn approximately $150,000. To earn as much under the current
system, the counsel must obtain a verdict in the $400,000 to $450,000 range. As noted, 50% of
current verdicts are less than $177,000. See supra note 25.
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ployer may have to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees, this amount pales in
comparison to the emotional distress and punitive damages awarded in
many cases. 247 Although the potential financial loss for employers will
be limited, the prospect of an award of backpay, reinstatement and attor-
neys' fees should deter arbitrary employment terminations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The time has come to reform wrongful discharge litigation. Given
the opposition of the plaintiff's bar to arbitration, juries should still de-
cide these cases, but courts should adopt a streamlined litigation proce-
dure and simplify the legal issues. Employees should recover emotional
distress and punitive damages only in cases involving termination in vio-
lation of public policy. Reinstatement as well as back pay should consti-
tute the remedy for all other terminations. Prevailing plaintiff's counsel
should recover attorney's fees not exceeding the back pay award. The
above approach will likely receive support from both the plaintiffs' and
defense bars because it protects employees from arbitrary discharges, and
avoid the excesses that have led to judicial reexamination of wrongful
termination actions in recent years.
247. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
November 1990]
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:57
